Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy by O\u27Brien, Shari
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 65 | Number 1 Article 10
11-1-1986
Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for
Surrogacy
Shari O'Brien
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 127 (1986).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol65/iss1/10
COMMERCIAL CONCEPTIONS: A BREEDING
GROUND FOR SURROGACY
SHARI O'BRIENt
He who is not childless goes down to his grave in peace.'
And surely a Man shall see, the Noblest workes, and Foundations, have
proceeded from Childlesse men; which have sought to expresse the
Images of their Minds; where those of their Bodies have failed.
2
For many couples the decision to become parents is frustrated by an
inability to conceive a child. These couples suffer considerable emo-
tional anguish, and in some cases the inability to conceive leads to mari-
tal conflict. Couples who cannot have children are presented with a
variety of options: come to terms with childlessness; pursue the adoption
of a child; or employ an alternative reproductive method such as artifi-
cial insemination. In recent years surrogacy has gained considerable
popularity as an alternative reproductive method. In a surrogate trans-
action a couple arranges for a third-party female to bear their child.
Although surrogate transactions are not a recent phenomenon, they take
place amid much controversy and confusion. Dr. O'Brien discusses the
evolution of surrogate transactions and spotlights the debate and uncer-
tainty surrounding commercial surrogacy transactions. She considers
various arguments in support of ratifying surrogacy transactions, and
examines the enforceability of surrogate parenting contracts. Dr.
O'Brien concludes that commercial surrogacy fosters a perception of
children as commodities, contributes to exploitation of and by surrogate
mothers, and should not be ratified.
I. INTRODUCTION
The animal side of our nature is to me too dreadful.
3
Despite the fact our Victorian forbears generally had large families, in the
typical nineteenth century home sex "was the skeleton in the parental cham-
ber .... Any untoward questions [about sex] were answered with a white lie
... ."4 Today, gamete donors and surrogate mothers rattle around in more and
more family closets and white lies are told not about engaging in sex, but about
circumventing it. The Victorians contrived a myth-that infants were dropped
t B.A. 1970, University of Toledo; M.A. 1972, University of Michigan; Ph.D. 1977, Bowling
Green State University; currently a law student at the University of Toledo College of Law. The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Jeffrey Rosenberg, Director of Public Policy for the
National Committee for Adoption.
1. G. SANTAYANA, REASON IN SOCIETY 43 (1924).
2. F. BACON, Of Parents and Children, in THE ESSAYS OR COUNSELS, CIVILL AND MORALL
(M. Kiernam ed. 1985) (lst ed. 1625).
3. Queen Victoria. Quoted in D. CROW, THE VICTORIAN WOMAN 52 (1972).
4. W. HOUGHTON, THE VICTORIAN FRAME OF MIND, 1830-1870 353 (1957).
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into nurseries by long-legged, long-billed birds 5-to obfuscate that having babies
was inextricably linked to sex and pregnancy. Today, the stork is less a myth
than a metaphor for the actual dissociation of conception, gestation, and rearing
that medical science has made possible.
6
This Article spotlights the controversy surrounding the ratification of sur-
rogacy, an increasingly popular7 reproductive method by which biological and
nurturing maternal roles are segregated.8 It examines the origins and modem
configurations of the practice, canvasses recent judicial and legislative develop-
ments, probes and rejects the arguments that state prohibitions of breeding-for-
hire transactions violate the parties' constitutional right of privacy, and consid-
ers the enforceability of surrogate parenting contracts allocating responsibilites
and placement. The Article concludes that commercial surrogacy fosters a per-
ception of children as commodities and contributes to exploitation of and by
host mothers. A marketplace for babies should not be countenanced. 9
II. DOING WHAT DOESN'T COME NATURALLY: THE CAUSES AND
CONTOURS OF SURROGACY
I could be content that we might procreate like trees, without conjunc-
tion, or that there were any way to perpetuate the World without this
trivial and vulgar way of union: it is the foolishest act a wise man com-
mits in all his life. 10
Avoiding pregnancy and childbearing are commonplace practices."1 The
5. "[O]ne suspects that some [Victorian] women, at any rate, would have been happy if the
stork had been a reality." Id. Queen Victoria, in fact, wrote to her daughter of feeling like a cow or
a dog during childbirth-"at such moments ... our poor nature becomes so very animal and unec-
static . . ."-and obliquely referred to conjugal relations as the "dark side of married life." F.
BASCH, RELATIVE CREATURES 36 (1974). She advised a daughter who married on the continent to
"think of England" when the occasion for performing marital duties arose. D. CROW, supra note 3,
at 52.
6. It is now conceivable that a child could be born with three distinct mothers (a genetic
mother, a gestational mother, and a rearing mother) and two fathers (a genetic father and a rearing
father), lending a whole new dimension to the celebration of Mothers' Day, Fathers' Day, and
Grandparents' Day.
7. It probably is impossible to gauge the exact number of people obtaining a child by surro-
gacy. Recent estimates of the number of babies born to surrogate mothers in this country are fixed at
600, "but their ranks are multiplying." Gelman & Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by Contract, NEWS-
WEEK, Nov. 4, 1985, at 74.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 27-40. Commentators, courts, and legislators have as-
signed to the practice an assortment of terms, none of which are distinguished by precision. A
surrogate, after all, is a substitute, yet the so-called surrogate mother is the actual, not a substitute,
mother. The author pleads guilty to the charge of employing some of the same slipshod expressions.
Her defense is an unwillingness to add further to the rogue's gallery.
A recent New Jersey case, In re Baby M., FM-25314-86E (Superior Court of New Jersey, Chan-
cery Division, Family Part filed May 6, 1986), has focussed national attention on the controversy
and confusion surrounding this area of the law. For a discussion of In re Baby M. and an overview
of the problems associated with surrogate parenting, see Galen, Surrogate Law, Nat'l Law J., Sept.
29, 1986, at 1, col. 1. See also infra note 193 (discussing the facts of the New Jersey case).
9. An intriguing proposal for a free market in babies is presented in Landes & Posner, The
Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
10. II T. BROWNE, RELIGIO MEDICI, § IX, at 110-11 (W. Greenhill ed. 1881) (1st ed. 1643).
Browne was a seventeenth century British physician.
11. See generally Dryfoos, Contraceptive Use, Pregnancy Intentions and Pregnancy Outcomes
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law poses few obstacles to those who wish to engage in sexual intercourse but
avoid pregnancies.12 At the same time, however, conception eludes a significant
number of involuntarily childless couples, for whom legal uncertainty surrounds
several contingent modes of conceiving children without engaging in sexual
intercourse. 13
Many couples whose parental aspirations have been thwarted by infertility
suffer enormous personal anguish and even marital conflict.1 4 A generation ago
adoption presented an alternative to a childless future. However, the wide-
spread use of contraceptives, the availability of abortions, and the destigmatiza-
tion of unwed motherhood have created a short supply of adoptable, healthy
infants.15 In 1984 two million couples contended for the 58,000 children placed
for adoption. The ratio of adopters to adoptees stood at thirty-five to one. 16
Some couples who want but cannot have children will accept one of several
conventional compromises available to them: come to terms with childlessness;
tolerate a very long period of waiting for an adoption placement; or pursue the
adoption of a special needs child.17 Other couples, frustrated and desperate, will
buy babies from black market brokers, who apparently do a brisk business in
today's society.'
8
Of course, if the fecundity of the male rather than the female partner is
impaired, the inveterate alternative reproductive method, artificial insemination
by donor (AID),19 the use of which today barely raises an eyebrow in most legal,
Among US. Women, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 81 (1982) (statistical survey of contraceptive use and
contraceptive failure). By 1982 the annual number of abortions performed in the United States had
exceeded one and one-half million. See NAT'L COMM. FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 18
(1985) [hereinafter ADOPTION FAcTBOOK].
12. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (expanding the scope of a woman's right to
seek an abortion by invalidating a Pennsylvania regulation requiring a doctor to determine viability
prior to performing an abortion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidating
statute requiring spousal and parental consent to an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (invalidating state ban on use of contraceptives by married persons).
13. In addition to surrogacy, other legally uncertain alternative reproductive methods include
embryo transfer and ova donation. See Krause, Artificial Conception: Legislative Approaches, 19
FAM. L.Q. 185, 190 (1985). For a discussion of these methods, see infra notes 19-40 and accompa-
nying text.
14. See Robertson, Surrogate Mothers: Not so Novel After All, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct.
1983, at 28, 29. The author recently had the opportunity to interview a couple enrolled in attorney
Noel Keane's surrogate parenting program in Dearborn, Michigan. The infertile wife, a sophisti-
cated, gracious-mannered lawyer, described in moving terms the heartache the couple has exper-
ienced during a ten-year childless marriage. The objective of this Article is neither to depreciate the
suffering of individual infertile couples nor to portray them as the unscrupulous predators of indi-
gent surrogates.
15. See R. LASNIK, A PARENT'S GUIDE To ADOPTION 56 (1979); Wilson, Adoption: It's Not
Impossible, Bus. WK., July 8, 1985, at 112.
16. See Wilson, supra note 15, at 112.
17. See R. LASNIK, supra note 15, at 56; ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 11, at 41-42.
18. See generally Note, Black-Market Adoption, 22 CATH. LAW. 48 (1976) (discussing
problems in regulating black market sales of children and "gray market" placement of children by
private adoption agencies); see also Louenheim, Innocence, Inc., STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1977, at 23
(reporting increased black market activity characterized by steep prices for infants); Podolski, Abol-
ishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547 (1975) (discussing
means of avoiding a black market in children).
19. Artificial insemination is the introduction of sperm into a woman vaginally to achieve preg-
nancy without sexual intercourse. See W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5-7 (2d ed. 1976).
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medical, and social circles, 20 is readily available.2 1 However, if the woman is
sterile or is afflicted with a childbearing impairment,22 the use of donated ova,
23
which is the closest female counterpart to AID, is less accessible, both medically
and practically. 24 Moreover, use of a donated egg does not provide a viable
solution unless ova nonproduction or tubal damage are the sole or primary im-
pediments to conception. Women without wombs simply cannot benefit from in
vitro fertilization,2 5 as there is no uterus into which an egg can be implanted and
nurtured. Thus, those women who are incapable of carrying a child either be-
cause they have undergone hysterectomies or because a medical condition like
diabetes makes pregnancy or childbirth dangerous, form, in large measure, the
pool of candidates who might consider procreation through proxy.
26
Surrogacy, the phoenix of alternative reproductive methods, is the oldest27
and technologically the simplest 2 8 means of procuring a child who is genetically
A nonexperimental, medically sophisticated technique that was first performed successfully in the
eighteenth century, H. DAVIS, ARTIFICIAL HUMAN FECUNDATION 8 (1951), artificial insemination
is the method by which an estimated 250,000 people alive in the United States in 1980 were con-
ceived. Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an Ex-
panded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 n.3 (1981). Heterologous artificial
insemination, or artificial insemination by donor, is the use of semen not that of the recipient's
husband. Homologous artificial insemination (H.A.I.), in contrast, is the use of the sperm of the
recipient's own husband; fewer legal issues-paternity and its attendant obligations and rights-are
raised in this situation. See Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331
(1979-80); Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 128 (1967). By 1984 twenty-five states had enacted statutes governing the artificial insem-
ination of married women. See Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproductive
Technologies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 54-55.
20. The Catholic Church opposes artificial insemination, however. See Smith, Intrusions of a
Parvenu: Science, Religion and the New Technology, 3 PACE L. REV. 63, 74 (1982).
21. See supra note 19.
22. Approximately 14% of currently married women of childbearing age are infertile. Mosher
& Pratt, National Center for Health Statistics: Fecundity and Infertility in the United States, 1965-
82, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS No. 104, at 5 (Feb. 11, 1985). The percent infertile excludes
the surgically sterile. A couple is classified as infertile if, for a period of at least one year, they were
sexually active, had not used contraception, and had not conceived. Id. at 4.
23. Some commentators have asserted that surrogacy is the female equivalent of AID. See
Robertson, supra note 14, at 30; Smith & Iraola, Sexual Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L.
REV. 263, 270-71 (1984). A sperm donor and an egg donor are logical counterparts, however, as
both contribute genetic material only and do not have even minimal involvement with the fetus that
results. The surrogate mother's involvement, on the other hand, is intensely personal. See AMERI-
CAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN SURROGATE MOTHER-
HOOD, STATEMENT OF POLICY (May, 1983).
24. In contrast to sperm, which is readily collected, ova can be obtained only through laparos-
copy, a surgical procedure performed under anesthesia. See P. SINGER & D. WELLS, MAKING BA-
BIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCEPTION 59-60 (1985). In addition, the cycles of the
egg donor and donee must be synchronized by the use of hormones. Id. See generally Gold, The
Baby Makers, SCIENCE, April 1985, at 26 (discussing the difficulties involved in ova transfers);
Mettler, Seki, Baukloh, & Semm, Human Ova Recovery Via Operative Laparoscopy and In Vitro
Fertilization, 38 FERTILITY & STERILITY 30 (1982) (discussing the problems, success rates, and
failure rates in the use of laparoscopy and in vitro fertilization).
25. In vitro fertilization is a medical procedure whereby egg and sperm are joined outside the
womb. See C. GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE: AN APPRAISAL OF EXTERNAL HUMAN
FERTILIZATION I n.1, 14-16 (1981).
26. P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra note 24, at 98.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 42-54.
28. A homespun account of the success of do-it-themselves inseminators is found in N. KEANE
& D. BREO, THE SURROGATE MOTHER 39-56 (1981).
1986] COMMERCIAL CONCEPTION
related to at least one of his or her parents. Broadly stated, in a surrogate trans-
action a couple arranges for a third-party female to bear their child.29 The
transaction can assume various forms. For example, the carrier may receive
payment or she may perform gratuitously;30 pregnancy may occur through arti-
ficial insemination or through intercourse; the surrogacy may be full or par-
tial;31 a written contract may have been prepared, or an informal verbal
agreement may govern 32 and the rearing couple may be homosexual or hetero-
sexual. 33 Pursuit of a proxy breeder may be the product of necessity due to the
29. Black, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 373, 373-74 (1981).
For an article presenting a similar discussion, see Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood,
1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147.
30. See N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 28, at 57-74 (narrating the experience of a woman
whose closest friend offered to have a baby for her); P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra note 24, at 109
(recounting the altruistic surrogacy carried out by one woman for her twin sister). In November
1985 Sherry King of Tamarac, Florida delivered, nine months after being artificially impregnated
with her brother-in-law's sperm, a baby for her sister. This gratuitous arrangement gained national
attention. Toledo Blade, Feb. 20, 1986, at 14, col. 1; cf. P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra note 24, at
99-100 (relating instances of payment for the surrogate).
31. The surrogate in a full surrogate pregnancy contributes nothing but the use of her womb;
her body is merely the incubator in which another woman's egg, fertilized in vitro, grows. The
popular media properly has dubbed this arrangement "renting a womb." In contrast, the surrogate
in a partial surrogate pregnancy contributes both the egg, which is fertilized either by artificial in-
semination or sexual intercourse, and the gestational environment. P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra
note 24, at 96. In August 1985 the first "true" or "full" surrogate pregnancy was confirmed. It was
achieved by "ovum implantation," a technique involving surgical removal of an egg from the in-
tended rearing mother, followed by external fertilization of the ovum with the semen of her husband
and then by implantation of the fertilized egg into the surrogate's uterus. Dr. Wulf Utian of Sinai
Medical Center of Cleveland performed the procedure. The genetic father and mother (sperm and
egg donors respectively) were granted a declaratory judgment on March 14, 1986, establishing bio-
logical parentage of the child, expected in late April. Under Michigan law no precise definition of
"mother" is available. In the absence of a court order directing otherwise, the state department of
public health requires the name of the woman who delivers the child to be recorded as its mother on
a certificate of live birth. See John Smith and Mary Smith v. Mike Jones and Jane Jones, No. 85-
532014-DZ, slip op. at 11, (Mich., Wayne County Cir. Ct., Mar. 14, 1986).
Embryo transfer ("prenatal adoption") is a reproductive technique best conceptualized as a
biological mirror image of ovum implantation. In this procedure, performed successfully for the first
time in California in 1983, a donated ovum undergoes initial cleavage inside the donor; the fertilized
ovum, or conceptus, is then transferred to the womb of the gestational mother, who is the intended
rearing mother. See J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND
MEDICINE 1323-24 (1984). Embryo transfer poses different legal and ethical issues from those posed
by surrogacy. For example, in a contest between the embryo donor and the embryo recipient, who
has the greater claim to the resulting child? See P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra note 24, at 64.
32. For a description of various surrogate contracts, see N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 28,
at 306 app.; Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263 (1981-82);
Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1978).
33. Lesbian couples have availed themselves of AID to form families. A sperm bank in north-
ern California reported that one-third of its unmarried female clients are lesbian. See Fertility
Rights: Medical Efforts to Help Childless Couples Pose Host of Difcult Issues, Wall St. J., Aug. 7,
1984, at 1, col. 1. (quoted in P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra note 24, at 54, 223-24); see also Han-
scombe, The Right to Lesbian Parenthood, 9 J. MED. ETHICS 133 (1983) (arguing that the homosex-
ual minority should not be excluded from parenthood). Although homosexual women have used
AID to obtain children, no case of a lesbian couple using the surrogate parenting technique has been
reported. However, it is not far-fetched to imagine that a lesbian who finds pregnancy unpalatable
might contract with a surrogate to carry a child for her by using sperm from an anonymous donor
and an egg donated by one of the females involved. Another possibility is that a lesbian couple may
wish to share maternity. One could contribute the gestational environment and the other the mater-
nal genetic material. Fertilization could be achieved in vitro by joining donor sperm and the ovum
of one of the women. In this way, both rearing parents would be biologically linked to the child.
However bizarre the procedure may strike some readers, it obviously is available technologically,
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would-be mother's reproductive incapacity, or it may stem from a desire of the
would-be mother to avoid inconvenience, morning sickness, a bulky torso, a ca-
reer interruption, or the discomfort of childbirth. 34 In the typical surrogate
parenting arrangement of the 1980s, however, a woman 35 contracts with a mar-
ried couple, the wife of whom is unable to conceive or carry a child, to be artifi-
cially inseminated with the husband's semen. An attorney, who often also has
recruited and screened the surrogate, prepares a surrogacy contract.36 A sub-
stantial fee, generally 10,000 dollars or more, is paid to the surrogate and a fee of
similar dimensions is paid to the attorney-broker. 37 Increasingly, organizations
have supplanted individuals as the brokers who match infertile couples with sur-
rogates and oversee the entire transaction. 38 In the vast majority of cases the
surrogate supplies both genetic (the egg) and gestational (the womb) materials.
39
Often, the rules of the organizations or individual brokers who orchestrate sur-
rogacy transactions preclude single people and unmarried couples from partici-
pating in surrogate parenting transactions. 4° The contours of modern surrogacy
now that full surrogacy is an accomplished fact. See supra note 31. The California Alternative
Reproduction Act, A.B. 1707, Cal. Legis., 1985-86 Session if enacted, would have specifically au-
thorized single men and women to obtain a child via surrogacy, with or without the use of donated
sperm or egg. See infra text accompanying note 104.
34. See P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra note 24, at 98-99; Pritchard, A Market for Babies, 34 U.
TORONTO L.J. 341, 345 (1984). For the ingenious theory that circumscribing the power of women
to engage third parties to undertake the toil of birthing is tantamount to "reproductive slavery," see
Morgan, Making Motherhood Male: Surrogacy and the Moral Economy of Women, 12 J.L. & Soc'Y
219, 229 (1985). But cf. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d
209, 215-16 (Ky. 1986) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) ("In my view the consequences which could
arise from the opening of the human uterus to commercial medical technology does not contribute to
the emancipation of women.").
35. The woman who conceives and carries the baby is often herself married. In fact many
surrogate brokers limit candidacy to women who have been or are married and who have already
borne children of their own. A perception exists that participation of childless single women is
undesirable not only because of an adulterous undercurrent, but also because of the absence of a
track record of successful childbirths. See Smith & Iraola, supra note 23, at 273; see also Brophy,
supra note 32, at 263, 265 (describing one organization's acceptance of potential surrogate mothers
only if they are over twenty-one years of age and have had at least one live, healthy child); Handel,
Surrogate Parenting, In Vitro Insemination and Embryo Transplantation, 6 WHI"rIER L. REv. 783,
785 (1984) (describing screening procedures and mandatory group counseling for surrogate candi-
dates required by one organization).
36. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 28-29.
37. See Robertson, supra note 14, at 28-29; see also Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The
Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 475 (1983) (estimating "a total cost of about $20,000
for the procedure"); Wrong mothers, wrong babies, THE ECONOMIST, April 20-26, 1985, at 63 ("A
commissioning parent can expect to pay some $20,000 for a baby, including medical and legal fees.")
(quoted in Krause, supra note 13, at 202 n.87).
38. A few of the "surrogate mother" services include Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. in
Louisville, Kentucky; Surrogate Family Services, Inc. in Dearborn, Michigan; The Hagar Institute
in Topeka, Kansas; Surrogate Mothering, Ltd. in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the National
Center for Surrogate Parenting in Maryland. Of the two dozen or so services in the United States, a
nonprofit agency in Louisiana has become the first to gain government approval. Wrong mothers,
wrong babies, THE ECONOMIST, April 20-26, 1985, at 63 (quoted in Krause, supra note 13, at 202
n.87).
39. For an explanation of full and partial surrogate pregnancies see supra note 31.
40. See Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky
Experience, 69 Ky. L.J. 877, 881 (1980-81) [hereinafter Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting].
State statutes introduced to date, however, are sufficiently ambiguous to allow for the transfer of the
child of a surrogate to a single parent of either sex. See Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate
Motherhood, II Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001, 3003 (Jan. 29, 1985). Some bills have expressly author-
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transactions diverge radically from surrogate arrangements as they existed
before the advent of the "high tech" stork age. Earlier prototypes bear but a
remote resemblance to late twentieth century surrogacy; parallels nevertheless
exist, and the similarities are as instructive as the differences.
III. SURROGACY AMONG THE ANCIENTS
What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be
done; and there is nothing new under the sun.
4 1
Proponents of surrogacy steadfastly cite its venerable biblical origins.42
The Hagar Institute in Topeka, Kansas, one of several burgeoning surrogate
parenting brokerages in the United States,43 has even derived its name from the
key player in the first recorded surrogate deal struck in history.44 No lawyers or
doctors participated in the Old Testament precedent. Rather, the eighty-six year
old Abraham heeded the advice of his barren wife Sarah, ten years his junior and
apparently well past menopause, to "go in to my maid"45 Hagar. The maid
conceived and a baby was born nine months later. Advocates of surrogacy,
however, usually fail to chronicle the turmoil that transpired between concep-
tion and birth.46 Soon after Hagar became preganant, she began to despise Sa-
rah, Sarah blamed Abraham, and Abraham insisted that Sarah handle Hagar.
Sarah in turn harshly rebuked Hagar, who consequently left town.47 Like mod-
em day couples confronting an uncooperative pregnant surrogate, Abraham and
Sarah might have been left with an empty nest and no effective remedy. God
intervened, however, urging Hagar to return, but at the same time acknowledg-
ing her anguish.48 At Sarah's insistence Abraham eventually cast out Hagar
and their son Ishamel,49 who would become "a wild ass of a man, his hand
against every man and every man's hand against him."'50 Later in Genesis the
story of Jacob, his two wives, and their proxies is imbued with equal measures of
ized that an unmarried couple may become the rearing family. See, e.g., Alternative Reproduction
Act, A.B. 1707, Cal. Legis., 1985-86 Session. It has been argued that preventing unmarried persons
from procreating by means of reproductive technology violates the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. See Comment, Surrogate Mother-
hood in California: Legislative Proposals, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 341, 383 (1981); Note, Reproduc-
tive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 675 (1985).
But see Smith & Iraola, supra note 23, at 284-85 (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions on
abortion and contraception do not protect a right to conceive).
41. Ecclesiastes 1:9 (Revised Standard Version).
42. See, e.g., Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Bibli-
cal Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 467 (1982); Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting, supra note 40,
at 880.
43. See supra note 38.
44. Genesis 16:1-15.
45. Id. 16:2 (Revised Standard Version).
46. See, e.g., Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting, supra note 40 (citing the biblical account




50. Id. 16:12 (Revised Standard Version).
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bitterness, jealousy, and spite.5 1
It is not surprising that the ancient Hebrews encountered difficulties in situ-
ations that are almost parodies of today's surrogate arrangements. But it is
ironic that surrogacy today is justified, in part, by way of allusion to these ill-
fated biblical anecdotes. If anything, history instructs that dormant in every
surrogate parenting arrangement is an explosive and tragic human drama. Fur-
thermore, the exchange of money and access to abortion that accompany mod-
em surrogacy were missing in the biblical surrogacies. Today's commercial
surrogate holds the trump card of abortion. Thus, extortion now supplements
the perennial possibilities of change of heart, envy, and suspicion. 52
Surrogacy in a rudimentary form- the adulterous method to which the
biological father's spouse acquiesced-no doubt was practiced in the millenia
bridging Hagar's day and ours. Certainly most civilizations throughout history
have regarded the production of heirs, especially male heirs, as woman's major
social and religious responsibility. 53 Men were thus permitted, not only in an-
cient Hebrew society, but also in Roman, Arabic, European, Medieval, and Ren-
aissance cultures, to displace barren wives with plural consecutive marriage and
concubinage. 54 It is beyond the scope of this Article to probe the status of alter-
native reproduction techniques through the ages. Accordingly, it is necessary to
take a quantum leap from an ancient to a contemporary setting.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SURROGACY IN THE EIGHTIES
Finality is not the language of politics.
55
Commercial surrogacy in the late twentieth century is practiced in a climate
of legal suspense. Participating lawyers, physicians, biological parents, and
spouses "may be committing a felony" 56 by transgressing statutes providing that
a person cannot pay for the custody of a human being. Theoretically, those
conspiring to commit the crime of buying or selling a baby could face twenty-six
years in jail.5 7 Commentators on both sides of the controversy surrounding
commercial surrogacy probably agree on at least one point: unequivocal legal
guideposts desperately are needed in this area.
A. Judicial Activity
Lawsuits brought by and against participants in surrogate parenting trans-
actions have occupied but a few court dockets in a handful of states. Doe v.
51. Id. 30:1-24.
52. For an eye-popping initiation into the darker side of surrogate arrangements, see N. KEANE
& D. BREO, supra note 28, at 99-114, 197-209 (1981). Keane, a Michigan attorney who is perhaps
the nation's foremost surrogacy entrepreneur and advocate, recounts, inter alia, the nightmarish
experiences of one couple who contracted with a lesbian addicted to drugs and alcohol who ex-
tracted more and more money from them during and after her pregnancy.
53. A. IDE, WOMAN: A SYNOPSIS 104 (1983).
54. Id.
55. Disraeli, Representation of the People, 152 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 966, 969 (1859).
56. Handel, supra note 35, at 784.
57. Handel, supra note 35, at 784.
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Kelley 58 was the first and is still a leading American case. The pseudonymous
John and Jane Doe had contracted with Mr. Doe's secretary to conceive, by
means of artificial insemination, and bear Mr. Doe's child for a sum of 5000
dollars plus medical expenses. The contract further stipulated that Mr. Doe
would formally acknowledge the paternity of the child at birth and that the
surrogate would consent to the child's adoption by the Does.59 The Michigan
Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' claim that sections of the state adoption
code prohibiting the exchange of money in connection with adoption and child
placement proceedings impermissibly infringed on their constitutional right to
privacy. 60 The court concluded that the disputed statutory provisions did not
interfere with plaintiffs' right to automony in deciding to bear or beget a child,
but rather "[precluded] plaintiffs from paying consideration in conjunction with
their use of the state's adoption procedures.
'6 1
More recently surrogacy advocates registered an uncertain victory in
Syrkowski v. Appleyard.62 The Michigan Supreme Court in Syrkowski permitted
a sperm donor to use the state Paternity Act, 63 designed as a procedural device
for determining paternity and enforcing the resulting support obligation, as a
vehicle for effectuating a surrogate parenting arrangement. Corinne Appleyard,
a married woman, gave birth to Teresa, her third child. All of the parties admit-
ted that the child was fathered through artificial insemination using George
Syrkowski's semen, pursuant to a surrogate parenting contract.64 Syrkowski
and his wife took custody of the child and paid Appleyard 10,000 dollars plus
expenses. 65 Five months before Teresa's birth, Syrkowski had filed a complaint
for filiation, relying on the Michigan Paternity Act. Nonadversarial defendant
Appleyard answered by admitting plaintiff's allegations and joining his request
for an order declaring his paternity. 66 Rejecting the intervening Michigan At-
torney General's argument that the relief requested disserved the purpose of the
Paternity Act, the supreme court sanctioned using the state's legislative and ju-
dicial apparatus to facilitate bringing a child born of a surrogate parenting con-
tract into its biological father's home.67 At the same time the court neither
overruled Doe v. Kelly nor expressed an opinion on the entitlement of Syrkowski
to other forms of judicial relief beyond a determination of biological paternity. 68
In other jurisdictions, the District of Columbia Superior Court in 1984 or-
dered a detailed factual inquiry into the ramifications of what it styled a surro-
gate mother adoption case.69 The issues raised in the opinion indicate a cautious
58. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
59. Id. at 172, 307 N.W.2d at 440.
60. Id. at 172-74, 307 N.W.2d at 440-41.
61. Id. at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
62. 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
63. MICH. COMP. LAwS § 722.714 (1979) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.494 (Callaghan 1984)).
64. Syrkowski, 420 Mich. at 369, 362 N.W.2d at 212.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 370, 362 N.W.2d at 212.
67. Id. at 375, 362 N.W.2d at 214.
68. Id. at 373, 362 N.W.2d at 213.
69. In re R.K.S., 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1383 (1984).
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approach to approving an adoption resulting from the natural mother's "aban-
donment" of her child to its biological father. 70 In late 1985 a California appel-
late court ruled that attorneys who represent parties to surrogate parenting
arrangements lack standing to attack the constitutionality of a state statute gov-
erning paternity in cases of artificial insemination. 71 The statute provides that
the sperm donor should not be regarded as the natural father of a child born to a
woman who is artificially inseminated. 72 Although the court expressed "grave
doubts" about the applicability of the statute to participants in a surrogate
parenting arrangement, it held that the parties' attorneys themselves possessed
no cause of action.
73
The Kentucky courts also have considered the legality of surrogate parent-
ing arrangements. 74 Two years after the State Attorney General issued an opin-
ion that surrogate parenting is unlawful in Kentucky, 75 a state circuit court in
1983 refused to permit a surrogate mother to use the machinery of the court to
terminate her parental rights.7 6 More recently, in the culmination of a series of
proceedings spanning several years, the high court of Kentucky in 1986 became
the first state supreme court to confront squarely the issue of the legality of
commercial surrogacy. Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Kentucky ex rel. Arm-
strong77 commenced when the Attorney General sought to revoke the corporate
charter of a medical clinic functioning as an intermediary between surrogates it
recruited and infertile couples. 78 Reversing the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the
supreme court held that the participants in a surrogate parenting procedure do
not violate the state statute prohibiting the sale or purchase of children.79 Com-
mercial surrogacy does not, the court concluded, differ biologically from "the
reverse situation where the husband is infertile and the wife conceives by artifi-
cial insemination."' 80 The majority, without elaboration, predicated its refusal to
proscribe surrogate parenting arrangements on a constitutional right of repro-
ductive privacy.81 The court devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to a
separation of powers treatise8 2 insisting that the social and ethical questions
raised in the solutions to infertility offered by biomedical science must be re-
solved "in the legislative domain, not the judicial .... [T]he threshold question
70. See id. Subsequent records of this adoption proceeding are sealed. The D.C. Corporation
counsel, however, appointed amicus curiae, revealed that the adoption petition was approved. Tele-
phone interview with the office of the District of Columbia Corporation (Nov. 21, 1985).
71. Sherwyn & Handel v. Department of Social Servs., 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778
(1985).
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983).
73. Shenvyn, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 59, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
74. For a discussion of other jurisdictions in which surrogate parenting disputes have arisen,
see infra note 193.
75. 1980-81 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 81-18, 2-588 (Jan. 26, 1981).
76. In re Baby Girl, 9 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2348 (1983).
77. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
78. Id. at 210.
79. Id. at 214. The court of appeals had concluded that its decision to prohibit the surrogate
parenting technique comported with legislative intent. Id. at 211.
80. Id. at 212. It is arguable that the process is distinguishable from AID. See supra note 23.
81. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 212-13.
82. Id. at 213-14.
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is whether the legislation on the books declares the procedure impermissible.
Short of such legislation it is not for the courts to cut off solutions offered by
science."
'83
Notwithstanding two vigorous dissents, 84 Surrogate Parenting Associates
has far-reaching precedential significance, if only because it is the first state
supreme court decision that braves, on a substantive level, the turbulent waters
of surrogate parenting. As that court recognized, however, the ultimate deter-
mination of whether women will be allowed to use themselves "as human incu-
bators and.., sell, for a price, all their parental rights in a child thus born"8 5
awaits the legislatures of Kentucky
8 6 and of forty-nine other states.8 7
B. Legislative Activity
Legislative response to procreative technology has been lethargic gener-
ally,8 8 but in the case of surrogate parenting lawmakers across the nation have
reacted catatonically. Although by 1985 every state had enacted legislation
criminalizing trafficking in children, no state has yet passed legislation either
expressly authorizing or proscribing surrogacy. 89 A string of bills, some sanc-
tioning and some prohibiting the practice, have gyrated through the legislatures
of at least twenty-one states, 90 but legislators unwilling to act have kept the legal
status of surrogate parenting in a state of suspended animation. An exhaustive
survey of the proposals that in all instances have encountered stalemate or defeat
is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, a laconic overview of two re-
cent bills will illustrate the general legislative orientation.
The Legislative Council of the District of Columbia has deliberated the
merits of a surrogate parenting regulatory act. As drafted the District of Co-
lumbia proposal91 mandates psychological counseling for both the surrogate and
her husband and the natural father and his wife.92 The natural father and the
host mother must submit to medical tests to detect genetic disorders or sexually
transmitted diseases. Under the bill the presence of sexually transmitted dis-
eases disqualifies an individual from participation in the procedure. 93 Within
twenty-four hours after the birth of the child, blood or tissue typing tests tending
to establish paternity are to be performed on the surrogate, her spouse, and the
infant. The results of these tests are to be made available immediately to all
parties. 94 The proposed legislation requires the surrogate and her husband,
83. Id. at 213.
84. Id. at 214 (Vance. J., dissenting), 214 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting separately).
85. Id. at 214 (Vance. J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 213.
87. See Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 40, at 3001.
88. See Krause, supra note 13, at 190-91; Wadlington, supra note 37, at 482-86.
89. Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 40, at 3003.
90. Survey ofState Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 40, at 3003.
91. Council of the District of Columbia Bill 6-152 (1985). The bill was introduced by Council-
man John Ray in 1985. No action has been reported.
92. Id. § 3(b)(3), (5).
93. Id. § 5(a)(1).
94. Id. § 6(a).
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prior to insemination, to consent in writing to relinquish their parental rights
and responsibilities permanently, effective upon the birth of the child. 95 Nota-
bly, the bill makes it unlawful to provide consideration to the surrogate or her
spouse except for reimbursement of medical and legal expenses, loss of income,
and costs incurred as a direct result of the pregnancy. 96 This not-for-profit pro-
vision, inconspicuously fused into an act that otherwise appears to champion
surrogate parenting, would actually serve more to hinder than to effectuate the
practice in the District of Columbia.9 7
In contrast to the District of Columbia proposal, California's Alternative
Reproduction Act, if enacted, would have authorized commercial surrogacy.98
Breathtakingly detailed, the California proposal99 aspired to anticipate most
contingencies. The surrogate mother's consent to termination of her parental
rights would have been voidable at her option twenty days after the child's birth
in the event that both the biological father and the intended mother died.100
The contracting couple would have nominated a guardian to take responsibility
for the child had the couple failed to survive and the surrogate opted not to
revoke her consent.101 The death of the biological father before completion of
the adoption would not have prejudiced the intended (rearing) mother's custo-
dial rights or her right to adopt the child.10 2 The proposal mandated a provision
for term life insurance on the lives of the surrogate and the infertile couple, as
well as adequate health insurance for the surrogate. 10 3 The California bill not
only expressly permitted a single person of either sex to obtain a child by hiring
a surrogate, but also permitted him or her to procure donor ova or sperm for
that purpose.'14 The resulting child would, by design, have had no biological
relationship to the single parent who contracted for his or her creation. 10 5 This
scheme approached the outer limits of deliberate splicing of the biological and
nurturing roles. The California proposal palpably distended the ostensible pur-
pose of surrogay-to furnish a means of procreation for infertile couples.
In at least fourteen other states, prosurrogacy legislation has been offered,
95. Id. § 4(c).
96. Id. § 5(d).
97. One commentator has noted that "since the services of a surrogate mother are far too oner-
ous to be provided gratuitously.., a prohibition on compensation for surrogate motherhood [would]
be equivalent to a prohibition of the practice." Black, supra note 29, at 389.
98. Alternative Reproduction Act, A.B. 1707, at 9, Cal. Legis., 1985-86 Session ("reasonable
monetary compensation shall be paid to the surrogate by the infertile couple").
99. Introduced March 7, 1985, the proposed Alternative Reproduction Act, A.B. 1707, Cal.
Legis., 1985-86 Session, had remained active and was in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as of
Feb. 24, 1986. On August 20, 1986, however, the bill was defeated in the Senate. Telephone inter-
view with Ray Lenau, California Legislature Bill Room (Oct. 22, 1986).
100. Id. at 5-6.
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Id. at 8-9.
104. Id. at 3.
105. A perspective on some of the drawbacks of segregating "the genetic, gestational, and rear-
ing dimensions of parenthood (except through rescue), as in adoption" is offered in McCormick,




but, as indicated, always has been jettisoned.10 6 One state, however, has taken a
small but unequivocal step in the direction of authorizing surrogacy. The Kan-
sas legislature in 1984 amended its adoption code to provide that the prohibition
against advertising by any individual or nonlicensed child placement agency to
procure a child for the purposes of adoption shall not extend to a prospective
surrogate mother or person seeking one.10 7 Coupled with the recent decision of
the Kentucky Supreme Court legalizing surrogacy,108 the Kansas amendment
may be a harbinger of the forbearance in the United States of commissioning for
the birth of children.
V. COMMERCIAL CONCEPTION: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
Motherhood is neither a duty nor a privilege, but simply ;he way that
humanity can satisfy the desire for physical immortality .... 109
Proponents of surrogacy have contended that entering into a surrogate
pregnancy arrangement is a fundamental right protected by the United States
Constitution.1 10 The basis for this contention is a series of Supreme Court cases
holding that the due process clauses of the fifth111 and fourteenth1 12 amend-
ments to the Constitution, together with the penumbral rights emanating from
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, 113 confer on individuals a right of pri-
vacy. 114 In precise terms, a right of privacy entails a right of autonomy in mak-
ing decisions touching on highly personal or family matters, such as bearing or
begetting a child. 115 Of far-reaching importance, in the landmark case of Roe v.
Wade 116 the Court found the right of privacy to be broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision to obtain an abortion. Those favoring commercial surrogacy
maintain that because the choice not to procreate is constitutionally protected,
106. Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 40, at 3003.
107. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-509 (1984).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
109. G. SELDES, THE GREAT THOUGHTS 444 (1985) (quoting Rebecca West).
110. See Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Surrogate ParentingAssocs.; Black, supra note 29, at 387-
92; Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA.
L. REv. 405, 408, 422 (1979).
111. The fifth amendment provides, in part, "nor [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
112. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
113. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("[S]pecific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance.").
114. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invali-
dating several state regulations of abortion procedures as hindering a woman's fundamental right to
choose to have an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a Texas statute
banning abortion except when necessary to save the mother's life); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (invalidating, on equal protection grounds, statute prohibiting the distribution of contracep-
tives to single persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning state statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptives, or counselling, or aiding others in their use); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating state statute providing for the compulsory sterilization
of felons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude).
115. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution protects
individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.").
116. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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the corresponding choice to procreate-and to employ any procreative method
available-should be symmetrically protected.1 17 Significantly, however, the
right to decide not to procreate, that is, the right to choose to terminate a preg-
nancy, is not absolute. Governments can justify the abridgement of the funda-
mental right to choose by demonstrating that a countervailing compelling state
interest is thereby promoted and that the means of promotion are closely tai-
lored to the end sought to be achieved.'1 8 Accordingly, after the second trimes-
ter of the pregnancy the state's interest in the potentiality of human life becomes
sufficiently weighty to justify checking the pregnant woman's interest in main-
taining "bodily integrity and life plans." 119 The state thus may proscribe abor-
tion at the beginning of the third trimester, when the fetus is thought to be
viable, except in the rare instances in which abortion is essential to preserve the
mother's life or health.'
20
The constitutional protection that society should accord to surrogate
parenting bargains is susceptible to parallel analysis. Although individuals have
a right to choose to conceive and bear children, that right should be no more
absolute than the right to decide not to conceive and bear children. The impair-
ment of the choice to procreate can be justified by establishing a countervailing
compelling state interest, the achievement of which is attainable through no less
drastic means than impairing that choice. Thus, for example, the state arguably
has a sufficiently ponderous interest in preserving the dignity of mankind to war-
rant prohibiting trans-species fertilization despite the fact a mentally ill person
might express a desire to breed and bear the world's first centaur or mermaid.12
1
Less facetiously, the state similarly may demonstrate a compelling interest in
preventing the commodification of children,' 2 2 averting human exploitation,
123
or perhaps in deterring the making of contracts that for all practical purposes
are unenforceable.'
24
The meager case law on the constitutionality of legislation barring, by im-
plication, commercial surrogacy 125 is marked by disparity and sometimes obscu-
117. See Black, supra note 29, at 387-92; Robertson, supra note 110, at 408; see also Surrogate
Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211-12 (equating the decision to avoid bearing children with the
decision to have children through artifical modes of conception).
118. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 463-64 (White, J., concurring).
119. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 931-32 (1978); see also Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-65 (1976) (determination of viability is a matter for the attending
physician, not the legislature or the courts). The trimester framework adopted in Roe and its prog-
eny has been attacked vehemently by some scholars. See, e.g., Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1641 (1979); see also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 458-61 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("the trimester framework.., is clearly on a
collision course with itself" and "potential life is not less potential in the first weeks of pregnancy
than it is at viability or afterwards").
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
121. See R. Scoir, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 41 (1981) (citing aborted experiments two decades
ago in Chinese laboratories inseminating a female chimpanzee with human sperm); see also Krause,
supra note 13, at 187 n.I 1 (quoting conclusions reached on interspecies fertilization by the Warnock
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology in Great Britain).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 144-50.
123. See infra text accompanying notes 137-43.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 175-209.
125. In Michigan, for example, provisions of the state adoption code prohibit exchanging money
[Vol. 65
COMMERCIAL CONCEPTION
rity. 126 It remains an open question whether statutes forbidding commercial
surrogacy interfere with the personal freedom to have a child or to select a pre-
ferred mode of reproduction, 127 or merely forbid prospective parties to an adop-
tion to confer or collect profit in tandem with their use of a state's adoption
process or termination of parental rights procedures.1 28 It is of course true that
the incidental effect of such legislation is to eliminate commercial surrogacy as a
potential means of procuring a child. The primary purpose and effect of such
statutes, however, is to forestall any and all forms of trading in children, rather
than to meddle with sexual conduct in the environs of a couple's bedroom,129 to
manipulate personal decisions on family size,' 30 or to check gratuitous surro-
gacy.13 ' An unsavory and clumsy, but nevertheless serviceable analogue is
found in the context of anti-prostititution statutes. 132 These laws criminalize
not mere sexual activity but meretricious sexual activity. People choosing to
gain and grant sexual access for payment will not succeed in persuading judges,
legislators, and citizens in most jurisdictions that their right of privacy-a per-
sonal liberty bestowed by the Constitution-is abridged by laws proscribing
prostitution. Those laws of course have the secondary effect of intruding into a
zone of privacy, but the private zone becomes a public precinct to the extent that
the sexual activity is for hire and harms society.
133
The highly intimate decision to bear and beget a child has long been recog-
nized as a fundamental right, the effectuation of which is well-insulated from
casual limitation by the state. 134 However, like pregnant women who seek abor-
tions, would-be commercial surrogates and couples who contemplate relying on
them to procure children are not "isolated in [their] privacy."' 135 When the state
meets its burden of demonstrating that another interest is significantly and nega-
tively implicated by the exercise of the right of autonomy in procreative matters,
or valuable consideration in connection with adoption proceedings. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 710.54 (West Supp. 1986) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(555.54) (Callaghan 1984)). Kentucky
has enacted a similar statute that also prohibits selling or purchasing "termination of parental
rights." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 58-87; infra note 193.
127. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 213.
128. See Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 176, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1981).
129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (asking rhetorically: "Would we allow
the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives?").
130. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (access to contraceptives is
essential to exercise the right of decision-making in childbearing matters).
131. Some commentators have stressed that by precluding payment to a surrogate, states would
essentially be extirpating this mode of reproduction, as few women will conceive and carry a child
for an infertile couple out of the goodness of their hearts. See Black, supra note 29, at 388-89.
132. All states but Nevada have legislation proscribing prostitution. See J. DECKER, PROSTITU-
TION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 81-92 (1979) (discussing prostitution-related controls and their
implementation in the United States).
133. Id. Perspectives on the causes and effects of prostitution are found in G. SCOTT, LADIES OF
VICE: A HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT DAY (1936); C. WINICK
& P. KINSIE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE (1971).
134. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
135. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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it may abridge that right. The sections that follow consider several of the conse-
quences of surrogacy that the state may assert as warranting prohibition.
VI. COMMODIFICATION AND OPPRESSION: THE INCIDENTS OF
COMMERCIAL SURROGACY
Money is indeed the most important thing in the world; and all sound
and successful personal and national morality should have this fact for
its basis. 136
A student commentator has urged that paying the surrogate mother for the
use of her reproductive system and the product that results from its use is logi-
cally indistinguishable from paying a sperm donor for his services and wares.
137
Other commentators argue that because compensation to a sperm donor is per-
mitted, a fortiori compensation to a surrogate mother should be permitted, as
pregnancy and childbirth are much more hazardous, painful, and time consum-
ing than donating semen. 138 The short answer to this argument is that semen is
distinguishable from a baby, even from a fetus, 13 9 and it is as much a product as
a service that is being bought in both instances. A more refined response ema-
nates from examination of other forms of human anatomical trafficking. A mod-
est fee is legitimately and customarily paid to those who donate blood.1
4°
Federal law, however, prohibits giving or receiving valuable consideration for a
human organ. 14 1 Applying the nimble syllogism of commercial surrogacy pro-
ponents, it is ironic that the law tolerates remuneration to blood donors but not
to organ donors on the ground that a person who gives blood is endangered and
inconvenienced to a lesser extent than one who gives an eye or a kidney. How-
ever, it is precisely because donating an organ is so risky, as well as so perma-
nent, that the law deters people from relinquishing nonregenerative parts of
themselves for mere money. When money animates the transfer of a human
substance, the issue of exploitation arises. The danger is that the transferor is
exploiting the desperate need of the transferee and that the transferee is exploit-
ing the financial need of the transferor. The potential for exploitation is mini-
mized when there is a marketing of blood or sperm. The seller is not imperilled,
the buyer pays a nominal fee, 142 and the commodity sold is fungible and regen-
136. G. SHAW, PREFACE, THE IRRATIONAL KNOT xiv (1905) (the remark was, of course, char-
acteristically satirical).
137. Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parenting, supra note 40, at 915-16.
138. See Black, supra note 29, at 380; Comment, supra note 42, at 477-78 n.85.
139. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-65, established that the state has a compelling interest in protecting a
viable (third trimester) fetus. But during the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may not proscribe
or even closely regulate abortions, as embryos at this stage are not viable. See id. Obviously, the
moral status of sperm or unfertilized ova (the gametes) does not forbid their waste. See P. SINGER &
D. WELLS, supra note 24, at 71. If sperm were placed on the same footing, legally and morally, as a
fetus or a newborn infant, nocturnal emissions could be regulated by society.
140. The debate on the relative merits of commercial versus gratuitous blood banks is presented
in R. TITMUSS, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP (1971).
141. 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West Supp. 1986) prohibits the purchasing, acquiring, or transferring
of organs for valuable consideration.
142. Sperm donors generally are paid between $20 and $35 per deposit. Nearly two-thirds of the
physicians in a 1977 study who performed artificial insemination relied on medical students or resi-
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erative. On the other hand, when an organ or an infant is being marketed the
seller experiences pain and substantial risks, the buyer may pay a hefty or even
an extortionate fee, and the commodity sold is unique and irreplaceable.
In addition, the sophism advanced by commercial surrogacy proponents
that a seller is merely recouping what he or she has expended in services14 3 has
no more merit in the context of procurement of another's baby than it does in
the context of procurement of another's organ. The services component cannot
be isolated from the goods component, especially when the idiosyncratic goods
are being supplied from the very body of the seller, and must be proffered if the
deal is to be consummated. For some of the same reasons that organ vending is
prohibited, commercial surrogacy should be prohibited. Lines can and should
be drawn between blood and organs, and between sperm and infants.
The apprehension of exploitation is heightened in the case of commercial
surrogacy by the presence of an exploitable third party: the child. Blood,
sperm, and even kidneys are not, as things without personality, capable of being
exploited. In contrast, a baby is not only an object through which adult parties
can exploit each other, but also can itself be abused. Sober commentators al-
ready have discussed the feasibility of cloning human beings who would serve as
spare parts reservoirs for organ transplant recipients. 144 Moreover, families
might conceive a second child for the purpose of using it as a bone marrow, eye,
or kidney donor for an existing sick child. 145 Of course, parents conceiving a
child by the mundane method might also contemplate using or abusing their
offspring. Commercial surrogacy, however, encourages conceptualizing babies
as commodities. The surrogate, at least, usually does not create a child merely
because she wants it for its own sake, 14 6 but because she wants to earn a fee from
its production. 147 As commercial surrogate transactions multiply, the notion
that children can be conceived for profit, or parental rights can be terminated for
dents for donations. See Curie-Cohen, Luttrell, & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemina-
tion by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 586-87 (1979).
143. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984, at C12, col. 2 (cited in Krause, supra note 13, at 200,
n.80).
144. See Peters, The Brave New World: Can the Law Bring Order Within Traditional Concepts of
Due Process?, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. Rnv. 894, 901-02 (1970); see also P. SINGER & D. WELLS, supra note
24, at 140 (suggesting that removing organs from clonal embryos at an early stage and growing them
in cultures would save the lives of many dying patients by decreasing the chances of organ rejection).
For several years researchers have produced frog clones successfully. See Watson, Moving Toward
the Clonal Man, ATLANTIC, May 1971, at 50. In 1981 scientists claimed to have created the first
clonal mouse. See J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CARRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND
MEDICINE 1329 (1984).
145. One set of California parents reportedly decided to produce a bone marrow donor-sibling
for their ailing child. See Krimmel, The Case against Surrogate Parenting, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Oct. 1983, at 35, 36 (1983).
146. Id. at 36.
147. Recent demographic and motivational data on 125 women who applied to be surrogate
mothers reveal that the vast majority require a fee for their participation, although surrogacy candi-
dates often have secondary motives for their participation. See Parker, Motivation of Surrogate
Mothers: Initial Findings, AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, Jan. 1983, at 117. During interviews with several
prospective surrogates at Noel Keane's Dearborn office on Feb. 22, 1986, the author discovered that
all the women were either unemployed or worked at low-paying positions. A variety of secondary
motives was articulated by this small cross section. These included the need to assuage guilt over an
abortion, the desire to "help" someone else, and the gratification obtained from being pregnant.
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a price, will become less shocking. These ideas might become especially ac-
cepted if states enact statutes authorizing commercial surrogate transactions.
Making this form of trade routine would alter social perceptions of children;'
48
babies, like automobiles, stock, and pedigreed dogs, will be viewed quantita-
tively, as merchandise that can be acquired, at market or discount rates. Once
society accepts dollars and infants as reciprocal, people will be less averse to
bearing children as a means to an end, 149 such as obtaining a bone marrow
donor. The closest historical antecedent to the commodification of humanity-
slavery in this nation only one hundred and twenty-five years ago-should pres-
ent some resistance to returning to a practice of legally sanctioned trafficking in
lives. 150
The impact on the surrogate's own children of her participation in a
childbearing-for-profit venture also should be considered. Presumably a young-
ster whose mother markets her genes and womb must be told something when
the newborn infant is never brought home from the hospital. A child who is told
half or all of the truth-that the baby is being "given" away, or that another
family is paying mother to have a child for them-might wonder if he or she,
too, or perhaps one of his or her siblings, is equally expendable.' 5 1 The surro-
gate's own nurtured child is not, of course, the only child who may suffer psy-
chological damage as a result of the transaction. At some point during
childhood, adolescence, or adulthood, a person who is the product of a commer-
cial surrogate parenting arrangement may well learn the facts surrounding his or
her conception, gestation, and adoption. Surrogacy enthusiasts might deny that
the revelation that one owes his or her existence to a commercial surrogate is
any more unsettling than is receiving the information that one is adopted. Ad-
mittedly, many conventional adoptees experience difficulties coping with their
adopted status.152 However, the imposition of potential emotional burdens on
the traditional adoptee is assuaged by the practical imperatives of an existing
situation. Adoption for him or her is, even with its attendant risks of feelings of
rejection and rootlessness, the best option available. This is true only because
the alternatives of institutionalization, foster care,153 or retention by a parent
148. See Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem,
52 S. CAL. L, REV. 669, 687-88 (1979).
149. Krimmel, supra note 145, at 36. Permitting commercial conceptions might also provoke a
"trade-in phenomenon." That is, "people would be tempted to 'trade in' unsatisfactory children and
'trade up' by purchasing a newborn." Pritchard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341,
349 (1984) (asserting that this concern would be realized only if the state did not regulate and
enforce child support obligations).
150. It has been suggested that the slavery prohibition of U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII poses an
obstacle to commercial surrogacy arrangements. See Comment, supra note 42, at 476 n.75.
151. The concern that siblings may experience confusion is not entirely speculative. Several
years ago the nine-year-old daughter of an expectant host observed, in response to the news that the
baby would be given away, "Oh good. If it's a girl we can keep it and give [my younger brother]
away." Womb for Rent, Los Angeles Herald Examiner, Sept. 21, 1981, at A3 (quoted in Krimmel,
supra note 145, at 39 n.15).
152. See generally J. SHAWYER, DEATH BY ADOPTION (1979) (advocating single parent families
from a feminist perspective); J. TRISELIOTIS, IN SEARCH OF ORIGINS: THE EXPERIENCES OF
ADOPTED PEOPLE (1973) (describing experiences of adoptees who search for their biological
parents).
153. The devastating effects of both institutionalization and successive foster care placements are
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who lacks the ability or desire to raise a child are decidedly less attractive.
Traditional adoptions are child rescue operations, not palliatives for disap-
pointed parents. The current adoption system allocates lives in being; the child
is already in a crisis. In short, adoption poses the least detrimental alternative
for the child. 154 In marked contrast, the host mother in a surrogate parenting
contract conceives the child intentionally for the very purpose of exchanging the
child for money. Rather than centering on the needs of a child, 155 the surrogate
model exists primarily to satiate the psychic and financial needs of adult parties.
Rather than providing a postconception solution to a fortuitous pregnancy, the
surrogate model inaugurates a birth that will culminate in separating a child
from its gestational and genetic mother. The resulting child may experience not
only the sense of rejection and isolation that are the occasional unavoidable by-
products of an orthodox adoption, but also a sense of worthlessness as a human
being because its natural mother calculated his or her worth in dollars.1 56
Those espousing the surrogate alternative have responded that the child
conceived for the very purpose of being adopted benefits by the contract. One
author maintains that, but for the commercial surrogate arrangement, that boy
or girl would never have been born. 157 If this species of logic were to prevail,
society would be hard pressed to justify any form of birth control because the
ontologists would convince us that, for an ovum, never being fertilized is a fate
worse than death. Significantly, in the context of wrongful life actions the courts
have generally rejected a metaphysical approach that attempts to weigh the rela-
tive benefits and burdens of nonexistence against impaired existence.15 8 In
Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories 15 9 a California court stressed that the suf-
fering of the child plaintiff who was afflicted with a hereditary disease could not
be justified by "[retreating] into meditation on the mysteries of life. We need not
be concerned with the fact that had defendants [a medical laboratory] not been
negligent [in performing pre-conception blood tests on the parents], the plaintiff
might not have come into existence at all." 160
This "but for" logic, however, is cogent only when summoned retroac-
tively, after a fetus already has been conceived or a person already has been born
well-documented. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 31-34 (1973); Goldfarb, Psychological Privation in Infancy and Subsequent Adjustment,
15 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 247 (1945); Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interests?, 43
HARV. EDUC. REV. 599 (1973).
154. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 153, at 53-64.
155. Waller, Borne for Another, 10 MONASH U.L. REV. 113, 114-15 (1984).
156. Denials that financial reward motivates women to have babies for another family can
hardly be given credence. Even proponents of surrogacy admit that "[i]t seems clear that unless
surrogate mothers can be offered meaningful compensation for their services, there will be very few
children brought into the world in this way .... Black, supra note 29, at 380; see supra notes 131,
147.
157. Robertson, supra note 14, at 29.
158. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982);
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
159. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). The holdings in Curlender and Turpin v.
Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982), are not congruous. See Scheid,
Benefits vs. Burdens: The Limitation ofDamages in Wrongful Birth, 23 J. FAM. L. 57, 63 (1984-85).
160. Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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as a result of a surrogate transaction. An analysis of the advisability of institu-
tionalizing commercial surrogacy in the United States should not be based on
such retroactive reasoning. Rather, such analysis should focus on avoiding the
problems created by commercial surrogacy arrangements. Thus, the argument
that without commercial surrogacy, some people who might otherwise have
been conceived will not be is unpersuasive.
A similarly flawed post factum analysis animates the assertion that the "best
interests" of the surrogate offspring are served by facilitating its adoption by the
biological father and his wife, who obviously want a child in a desperate way. 16 1
To initiate a situation that is inherently fraught with difficulty for the child, and
then to defend it as in the best interests of the child by resolving it in the least
harmful way is illogical. By a parallel sophistry, slavetraders and owners in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries justified the retention of slavery. The very
forces responsible for kidnapping and enslaving black men, women, and children
defended the perpetuation of the institution by underscoring the "benevolent"
sanctuary it furnished to its prostrate, uneducated, resourceless victims. Obvi-
ously, the problems created by slavery differ tremendously from those created by
commercial surrogacy arrangements. However, the ingenious casuistry offered
to condone slavery illustrates how readily an exploitive institution can be de-
fended by characterizing its victims as beneficiaries.
Another serious objection to commercial surrogacy is that a market mecha-
nism for acquiring a child fosters an expectation, perhaps a demand, for product
quality. Purchasers who are disbursing 25,000 dollars to obtain an infant from a
third party may be reluctant to accept an imperfect child. 162 Because the baby
is not entirely "theirs" but half "hers," the couple may attribute the defect to the
host mother's faulty genes, or perhaps to inadequate prenatal care.16 3 If the
contract parents reject the child, it is likely that the biological mother will also
refuse to keep the child because she did not bargain for raising even a healthy
infant. 164 Admittedly, if a state enacted legislation sanctioning surrogacy, the
statute could allocate custody in the event of the birth of a mentally or physi-
cally impaired newborn. 165 Foisting parental duties on the contract parents,
who would be viewed as assuming the risk of faulty "merchandise," makes per-
fectly good sense as a matter of contract law. The essential problem, however, is
not resolved by an assignment of custody. The subject matter of the contract,
161. Black, supra note 29, at 386.
162. Krimmel, supra note 145, at 37.
163. Krimmel, supra note 145, at 37.
164. In perhaps the most well-publicized birth in the United States, the baby was born with
microcephaly, a condition of abnormal smallness of the head, usually linked to mental retardation.
The contracting father, Mr. Malahoff, separated from his wife, rejected the child. On national televi-
sion, the results of blood and tissue tests confirming that Malahoff was not the natural father were
disclosed. See Waller, supra note 155, at 120.
165. California's proposed surrogacy bill, for example, provides that "[t]he infertile couple shall
take custody of and parental responsibility for, any child conceived pursuant to a surrogate contract
... regardless of whether the child suffers from any.., defect, unless the.., defect is the result of




burdened with a disability or an illness, could easily sustain tremendous emo-
tional damage.
Commercial surrogacy and its latent potential for devaluing perceptions of
human worth is assailable on still another ground. Price differentials inevitably
develop in any market. Because there exists a glut of nonwhite infants1 66 who
are available for adoption through the usual nonprofit channels, 16 7 minority
host mothers would not be in high demand. White, Anglo-Saxon surrogates and
their babies would fetch higher prices than Black or Hispanic ones.1 68 Simi-
larly, the supply of physically, mentally, or emotionally disadvantaged homeless
children, adoptable through nonprofit agencies, exceeds the demand of inter-
ested adopters. 169 With no "market" for these special needs children, commer-
cial surrogacy would foster the view that sick children are "worth less" than
healthy children. 170 Furthermore, tall, fair surrogates with classic profiles and
straight teeth might command higher prices for their goods than might short,
swarthy surrogates with crooked noses and overbites. Of course, human beings
already are assessed by race, size, and physical appearance, and discriminatory
treatment results. The reality of this scheme of evaluation must be acknowl-
edged, but it need not be buttressed. The market mechanism engendered by
surrogacy would animate overt calculation of the pecuniary value of persons,
indirectly undermining the battered but cherished notion that all men and wo-
men are created equal.'
7 '
The dangers of exploitation and commodification inherent in commercial
surrogacy, then, arguably constitute ponderous countervailing interests that
states may identify as outweighing the right of privacy asserted by prospective
surrogate parents.
One final objection to commercial surrogacy warrants further examination:
the inculcation, in the parties to a surrogacy, of the illusion that making a con-
tract shelters them from injury. Surrogate parenting contracts are indigenously
"ambulatory" instruments. 172 It is not an overstatement to delineate them as
"[resting] on sand dunes supporting pillars of rubber and floors of turf."'1 73
166. See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 11, at 35; see also O'Brien, Race in Adoption Pro-
ceedings: The Pernicious Factor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485 (1986) (arguing against the use of race as a
factor in adoption proceedings).
167. Conventional adoption is not without expenses, but the average cost of $6,000 is not much
higher than costs incurred in a typical pregnancy and delivery. See ADOPTION FAcTBOOK, supra
note 11, at 23.
168. See Pritchard, supra note 149, at 351-52.
169. See ADOPTION FAcTBOOK, supra note 11, at 41.
170. See Pritchard, supra note 149, at 351.
171. Pritchard, supra note 149, at 351.
172. Ambulatory means "not yet fixed legally or settled past alteration." WEBSTER's THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged 1971). Frequently used to describe wills, the term
ambulatory provides an apt characterization of surrogate parenting contracts.
173. C.I.T. Corp. v. Jonnet, 419 Pa. 435, 438, 214 A.2d 620, 622 (1965) (Justice Musmanno's
baroque metaphor was offered in the context of modification of contracts by subsequent oral
agreement).
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VII. CREATING BABIES BY CONTRACT
[C]ontract rights are [not] absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will ... exercise his freedom of contract to work...
harm. 174
Surrogate pregnancy contracts arguably can be viewed as illegal, and hence,
as void. A contract is illegal "if either its formation or its performance is crimi-
nal.., or otherwise opposed to public policy.' 175 Generally, an illegal contract
is void, a nullity; that is, it is treated as though it had never been formed.
176
Surrogacy proponents urge that an inspection of the many state statutes
criminalizing the purchasing of children compels the conclusion that the literal
terms of the law are not violated by a skillfully prepared contract to conceive
and bear a child. 177 If this conclusion were endorsed, a court could find con-
tracts illegal only on the grounds of public policy; an "unruly horse"' 7 8 with
blurred features that many courts are reluctant to mount. Therefore, interpreta-
tion of the pertinent provisions of state adoption codes is pivotal.
State statutes typically provide that money may not be offered, given, or
received in connection with the placing of a child for adoption. 179 In addition, a
prohibition against exchanging money for the termination of parental rights ap-
pears in many statutes.' 80 Attorneys representing parties to a surrogate preg-
nancy arrangement have attempted to circumvent the letter of such statutes by
drafting contracts that vigilantly exclude any reference to the infertile wife who
is the only adoptive parent implicated; the written instrument focuses exclu-
sively on the legal relationship between the biological father and the infant, a
relationship that defies characterization as an adoption.
18 '
Despite this clever drafting device, it is clear that the infertile wife is the
"sine qua non" of the transaction;182 the studied omission in the contract of her
intended role is, as one commentator has noted, "an obvious subterfuge" that
most courts should discern and repudiate.
183
Surprisingly, the Kentucky Supreme Court, in its recent validation of surro-
gacy in that state, has elevated form over substance by articulating its willing-
ness to overlook what the agreement contemplates in fact, but camouflages on its
174. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934).
175. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932).
176. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 18 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter CALAMARI &
PERILLO].
177. See generally N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 28, at 275-305 (reproducing model con-
tracts); Brophy, supra note 32, (annotating a model contract).
178. Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
179. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1060 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (providing that "[n]o person may
request or accept any fee, compensation, or any other thing of value as consideration for relinquish-
ing the custody of a child for adoption"). For similar statutes, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 2A:96-7
(1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984).
180. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986).
181. See Brophy, supra note 32, at 264, 268.
182. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211.
183. Wadlington, supra note 37, at 476.
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face: adoption of the child by the spouse of the biological father.1 84 One could
even view the fact an adoption is anticipated by the parties to the contract as an
irrelevancy in assessing the legality of the contract. Some state statutes provide
that no child may be bought, sold, or procured for purchase or sale for any
purpose.' 85 On a broader scale, the thirteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution tacitly forbids making chattels of people.18 6 The common thread is
the sale of human beings, which dehumanizes people by demoting them to the
status of chattels.
Surrogate pregnancy contracts may violate another category of statutes in
force in many states. These laws preclude prenatal consent to adoption, typi-
cally requiring a lapse of a minimum number of days after childbirth before
voluntary termination of parental rights. 187 Surrogate advocates offer the spe-
cious argument that the host mother's preconception commitment to terminate
her parental rights is nothing more than a voidable expression of intention.
188
Because it is voidable-that is because the promise can be avoided by the
mother at her election' 8 9-it does not violate a mandatory waiting period im-
posed by law.190 However, a contract that violates the law is not rendered legal
by bestowing the power to escape its terms on one of the parties. If the courts
accepted this argument, the application of the bromide of voidability would, ipso
facto, insulate every illegal contract from judicial nullification. 19 1
Even if state statutes were amended to exclude surrogacy specifically from
the ambit of the laws prohibiting the purchase and sale of children for adoption
purposes, parties to an agreement and the courts to which they would resort
would flounder in their attempts to find viable remedies to disputes. Either
party may breach the contract in numerous ways and at diverse points during its
execution.192 Of all the possible scenarios the imagination can devise, that of the
host mother refusing to relinquish the child after it is born is one of the likeliest
types of breach and the one having the most dramatic effects. 193 It serves as
184. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 212-13.
185. See, e.g., Ky. RE'. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); see also Surro-
gate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 214 (Vance, J., dissenting) (concluding that the surrogate
parenting transaction involves a sale of a child in contravention of state law).
186. Section one of the thirteenth amendment provides: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment... shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
187. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.08 (Page 1976).
188. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 212; Note, In Defense of Surrogate Parent-
ing, supra note 40, at 888-91, 900-02.
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981).
190. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 213.
191. For a discussion of the distinctions between void (illegal) and voidable contracts and the
effects of illegality, see CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 176, at 18-19, 780-92.
192. See Comment, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies Under Legislative
Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601, 609-17 (1984).
193. The New Jersey case of In re Baby M., FM-25314-86E (Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part filed May 6, 1986), illustrates the problems caused by such a breach.
In Baby M. William Stern provided his sperm and promised to pay Mary Beth Whitehead $10,000
for her services as a surrogate mother. Three days after the child's birth Whitehead relinquished the
baby to the Stems. One day later, however, she changed her mind and begged for the baby's return.
The Sterns complied, but later-armed with a court order and five police officers-went to retrieve
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well as any other kind of breach to illustrate that even if a surrogacy contract
were legal, its enforcement would pose considerable difficulties. If the host
mother makes a postnatal decision to retain the baby, the contracting couple
could sue either for money damages or specific performance.1 94 The measure of
damages in contract actions usually is limited to compensation for pecuniary
loss sustained by the breach. 195 Money damages, however, would inadequately
redress the grievance of an infertile couple within the framework of a surrogate
parenting transaction. First, the biological father and his spouse would suffer
profound personal loss that could not be assuaged by an award of damages. 196
Second, even if an award of money damages somehow could restore the infertile
couple to the position they would have been in had the contract been performed,
in all likelihood the judgment could not be successfully levied against the
breaching natural mother. Even proponents of surrogacy concede that well-to-
do women generally do not seek employment as surrogates. 197
When damages at law do not afford adequate relief, a court may, in its
discretion, decree specific performance.' 98 A traditional prerequisite to a decree
of specific performance is that the subject matter of the contract be unique, as
opposed to fungible. 199 That requirement clearly is met in the surrogate parent-
ing context. A court will decline, however, to direct specific performance when
an order to perform-to deliver over the child to the contracting couple-would
introduce compulsion into close personal relationships. 20 0 A decree to deliver
over the child to the contracting couple indeed would constitute compulsion and
intrusion into close personal relationships. Other equitable factors a court may
the child. Whitehead and her husband somehow were able to elude the Stems and fled to Florida
with the child. The Stems located the Whiteheads in Florida and brought the child back to New
Jersey. In May 1986 the Sterns were awarded temporary custody of the baby, and Whitehead was
granted limited visitation rights. The case probably will go to trial and the decision could have a far-
reaching impact on surrogate parenting law in this country. See Galen, supra note 8, at 1, 8, 10;
Lacayo, Is the Womb a Rentable Space?, TIME, Sept. 22, 1986, at 36; The Case of the Breach of a
Contract Baby, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1986, at 66. If a court finds that a surrogate parenting contract
is unenforceable the dispute becomes a custody fight. See Galen, supra note 8, at 8. A recent Illinois
decision offers a potential solution to such disputes. In Wagner v. Erber, 85 D 6382, a Cook County
circuit judge awarded joint custody of a five-year-old girl to the girl's mother, the mother's ex-
husband, and the girl's biological father. For a brief discussion of Wagner and its potential relevance
to surrogate parenting disputes, see Middleton, Judge Awards 3-Way Custody, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 13,
1986, at 3, col. 1.
At least three other cases involving a surrogate mother's breach of contract have been settled
out of court. See 7 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2351 (1981) (discussing a California case in which the
surrogate mother was granted custody under the settlement); Galen, supra note 8, at 10 (discussing
the California case and two other cases, one from Michigan and one from Ohio, in which the surro-
gate mothers were granted custody under the out-of-court settlements). In a fourth case the surro-
gate mother lost a custody fight that ultimately was resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court. In In re
the Petition of Steve B. D. and Linda Sue D., No. 15998, slip. op. (Idaho June 17, 1986), the surro-
gate lost her custody fight that began three weeks after terminating her parental rights in an adop-
tion proceeding. See Galen, supra note 8, at 10.
194. Comment, supra note 32, at 620.
195. L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS 394 (2d ed. 1965).
196. Black, supra note 29, at 393.
197. Black, supra note 29, at 393.
198. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 176, at 581.
199. See U.C.C. § 2-716 (1977); J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 500-01 (1974).




examine in determining whether to compel specific performance are the ade-
quacy of the consideration and the harshness of enforcement,2 01 either of which
could, in this context, prompt a court to eschew specific relief. Finally, one
cannot overstress the discretionary nature of equitable relief.2 0 2 In adjudicating
the demand that the host mother surrender the child to the contracting couple, a
court would be exercising its "sound discretion. '' 20 3 Compelling a woman to
give up her newborn pursuant to the terms of a mere contract may impress a
court as disturbingly incongruous with the line of cases2° 4 holding that a woman
cannot be compelled to carry to term a previable fetus.20 5 On this basis specific
relief may be witheld. A court refusing to divest a parent of custody by virtue of
a contractual obligation20 6 would then resolve the dispute by considering the
relative ability of the two biological parents to raise the child.20 7
Surrogate pregnancy contracts, then, are not only of doubtful validity under
the law of most states, but also entail intractable enforcement problems and
great risks to all parties. Notably, the retainer agreement used by one Los Ange-
les law firm that limits its practice to surrogate parenting warns, "[t]he possible
adverse consequences to the Adopting Couple are too numerous and complex to
state, but it is possible.., that the Surrogate might clearly breach the agreement
and yet the Adopting Couple may be ordered to pay.., child support for a child
they do not get."' 208 Creating a child in the framework of a contract is "like
trying to fit a square peg into a round hole."
2 0 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
Thou art thy mother's glass, and she in thee calls back the lovely April of
her prime .... 210
To possess the end and yet not be responsible for the means,... this is
... the chief hypocrisy of our time.211
Commercial surrogacy has been hailed as a salutary means of fulfilling the
parental aspirations of infertile couples. 212 Furthermore, the choice to engage in
201. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 176, at 594-95.
202. CALAMARI & PERRILO, supra note 176, at 588-89.
203. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 176, at 588.
204. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (a woman's decision to
obtain an abortion is not subject to spousal consent); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state may
not compel a woman to persevere in a pregnancy until the onset of the third trimester).
205. See Comment, supra note 42, at 470.
206. See In re Rhea, 207 Kan. 610, 612, 485 P.2d 1382, 1384 (1971) (a child is not a chattel and
cannot be made the subject of a contract or a gift).
207. See Comment, supra note 192.
208. See Andrews, The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of the New Reproductive Technologies, 6
WHITTIER L. REV. 789, 797 (1984).
209. Id. at 796 (quoting a Jefferson County Kentucky Circuit Court judge).
210. W. Shakespeare, Look in Thy Glass in IMMORTAL POEMS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 56
(0. Williams ed. 1966).
211. Drug Experiments and the Public Conscience in CONFRONTING INJUSTICE: THE EDMOND
CAHN READER 368, 372 (L. Cahn ed. 1962) (quoted in Waller, supra note 155, at 129).
212. See N. KEANE & D. BREO, supra note 28; Black, supra note 29; Note, In Defense of Surro-
gate Parenting, supra note 40. But see Robertson, supra note 14, at 34 (concluding that surrogacy is
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a commercial surrogate parenting arrangement has been exalted to the level of a
constitutionally protected right of reproductive privacy. 213 However, the right
of privacy is inappropriately summoned to insulate participation in commercial
surrogacy. The fundamental right of privacy in childbearing matters is intended
to guarantee the right of an individual to control his or her own reproductive
faculties, 2 14 not to commission and monitor 2 15 the pregnancy of a third party.
Arrangements that induce an often financially needy woman 2 16 to assume for
money the burdens of childbearing, and auxiliary contracts forbidding her from
seeking an abortion or keeping her baby should she have a change of heart, stand
the right of privacy on its head. Perhaps it is for this reason that the problem of
childlessness among the infertile has not been solved by tendering to women
contemplating abortions financial incentives to bear and then surrender their
children. 2 17 Arguably, holding out fiscal carrots to women 2 18 to forego abor-
tions would collide with Supreme Court decisions establishing that a woman's
choice to terminate a pregnancy cannot be burdened, directly or indirectly.
21 9
Even if the decision to commission a birth were found to fall within consti-
tutional parameters, the right of privacy has never been defined as absolute. 22
0
Encumbrance of the right is justified by the presence of weighty countervailing
interests. In the context of surrogacy, there are a number of discernible counter-
balancing interests. These include the dangers of commodification and oppres-
sion, and massive roadblocks to enforcing surrogacy contracts-even if they are
found to be legal.
In contrast, meager risks attend altruistic surrogacy. The potential for
commodification is avoided, and the potential for exploitation is minimized. Be-
cause gratuitous surrogacy arrangements usually occur among friends or rela-
"neither the evil nor the panacea that many have thought" and that surrogacy may be feasible if
carefully regulated).
213. See supra text accompanying notes 110-17.
214. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 216 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
215. Surrogate parenting contracts typically contain pregnancy policing clauses stipulating that
the surrogate is not permitted to smoke, use alcohol or illegal drugs, or even take an aspirin without
the written consent of the overseeing obstetrician. In addition, she must submit to medical examina-
tions at prescribed intervals during her pregnancy. See Brophy, supra note 32, at 283.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47; see also Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d
at 216 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) ("The offer of financial payment will undoubtedly persuade
financially needy women to sell their reproductive faculties for the benefit of those who can pay.").
217. If the dwindling supply of adoptable infants comes to be viewed as a tragedy of national
dimensions triggered by the prevalence of abortion, then the right to choose to terminate a preg-
nancy might be fettered more properly through straightforward rather than circuitous governmental
responses.
218. The more impoverished the woman, the more tempted she might be to grab the carrot. In
effect, fetuses of well-to-do women who could afford to pass up the carrots would be at a disadvan-
tage. On the other hand, many minority women (and their fetuses) might not be offered the financial
incentive, because there is no foreseeable dearth of minority children available for adoption. See
ADOPrION FACTBOOK, supra note 11, at 35.
219. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427-31 (1983)
(abortion regulations designed to influence a woman's informed choice between abortion and child-
birth do not withstand strict scrutiny); cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980) (governmental
spending statute encouraging women to prefer childbirth over abortion permissible only because "no
restriction on access to abortions that was not already there" was added) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
220. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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tives, 22 1 the likelihood of breaches is greatly reduced. Accordingly, enforcement
problems rarely occur. In fact, an understanding between sisters or intimate
friends probably is not cast in the matrix of a contract at all. "Philanthropic"
surrogacy, then, is virtually benign and its suppression advances no weighty
state interest.
Society should not discount the suffering of the infertile couple whose at-
tempts at creating a family have failed.222 Their pain is real. Accordingly,
funds and talent should be committed to the vigorous pursuit of means of recti-
fying and preventing childbearing impairments. 223 The current adoption system
should be revamped to eliminate unnecessary red tape and other obstructions to
expeditious placement. 224 Adoption of foreign and special needs children
should be promoted and facilitated.225 Before dashing blithely toward the ratifi-
cation of commercial surrogacy as an alternative reproductive method, however,
this brave new society should reconsider the grave implication of transmuting
the fairytale stork into a flesh and blood purveyor of babies.
221. See supra note 30.
222. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the underallocation of research and technological resources to identify-
ing and redressing infertility, see Morgan, supra note 34, at 225-26.
224. The proposed Model Adoption Act, which would seek to ameliorate the imbalance between
childless infertile couples and unwanted, displaced children, is discussed in Leavitt, The ModelAdop-
tion Act: Return to a Balanced View of Adoption, 19 FAM. L.Q. 141 (1985). But cf Schur, The ABA
Model State Adoption Act: Observations from an Agency Perspective, 19 FAM. L.Q. 131 (1985) (dis-
cussing the possible problems that might arise under the Model Act).
225. See generally R. LASNIK, supra note 15 (describing the proposed MODEL STATE SUBSI-
DIZED ADOPTION ACT); ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 11, at 41-42 (discussing the availability
of special needs children and the difficulties associated with placing such children).
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